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The Misuse of Deference and International Standards in Narrowing
Withholding of Deportation in Light of INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre
Giuseppe Fina†
One field of international law, which plays a powerful role in our society, is the law of
refugees.1 This becomes readily apparent as the number of refugees ranges between thirteen and
eighteen million globally.2 The United States alone determined that it would admit 91,000
refugees during 1999.3 Courts and administrative agencies interpret and apply international legal

† J.D. Candidate, May 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; Bachelor of Arts, with
honors, DePaul Univ. 1998.
1

David A. Martin, Refugees and Migration, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER, 391 (Oscar Schachter &

Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995) (explaining that although refugee law has gained influence, a strong UN refugee
protection system will still be necessary). The word “refugee” derives from the French word réfugié, which
originally referred to Protestant Huguenots expelled from France after Louis XIV abolished the Edict of Nantes in
1685. See W. GUNTHER PLAUT, ASYLUM: A MORAL DILEMMA 12 (1995). For some time, it continued to
be used to mean Huguenots, but its meaning eventually expanded into a general term denoting people who had left
their home country due to duress. See id.
2

See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Towards a Comprehensive Regional Policy Approach: The Case for Closer Inter-

Agency Cooperation, 5 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 347 (1993) (observing that there are 18 million refugees worldwide
and another 24 million internally displaced persons); see also Ranee K.L. Panjabi, International Politics in the
1990’s: Some Implications for Human Rights and the Refugee Crisis, 10 DICK J. INT’L L. 1, 4-5 (1991) (noting
that approximately 15 million people have fled from their homes in recent years to escape violence and poverty).
3

64 Fed. Reg. 47, 341 (1999). President Clinton raised the number of refugee admissions to the United States from

78,000 to 91,000 for Fiscal Year 1999 in order to admit Kosovar refugees. See id. The President determined that an
unforeseen refugee emergency exists in Europe, and that the admission of the Kosovars was justified by “grave
humanitarian concerns” which were in the United States’ interest. Id. In the United States, the ceiling for refugee
admissions has had a downward trend from 207,000 in 1980 to 91,000 for 1999. See Refugee Consultation, 1999:
Hearings on Refugee Admissions to the United States for Fiscal Year 2000 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of
the Senate Comm. Of the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (August 4, 1999) (statement of Bishop Nicholas DiMarzio, Bishop
of Camden New Jersey, Chairman of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee). It has been argued
that the ceiling for refugee admissions should be placed no less than 132,000, which is the admissions level when
President Clinton came into office. See id. (statement of Ralston H. Deffenbaugh, Jr., President, Lutheran
Immigration and Refugee Service; Vice-Chair, InterAction Committee on Migration and Refugee Affairs).
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standards daily to determine the fate of refugees.4 One of these standards is the concept of nonrefoulement.5
The duty of non-refoulement is enshrined in Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the

The United States’ experience with masses of refugees on its borders may be recently seen in the exodus of
Haitians. See Claire P. Gutekunst, Interdiction of Haitian Migrants on the High Seas: A Legal and Policy Analysis,
10 YALE J. INT’L L. 151, 154 (1984). For several decades, political repression, human rights abuses and economic
deprivation in Haiti have led to a steady flow of migrants seeking refuge in the countries neighboring Haiti and the
United States. Id. at 152-154. The United States domestic and foreign policy regarding Haitian refugees has had
“three goals: 1) to exclude, detain, and restrict the use of parole for Haitians physically present in the United States,
2) to interdict Haitians on the high seas, and 3) to process Haitian refugees in their own country.” Carlos OrtizMiranda, Haiti and the United States During the 1980s and 1990s: Refugees, Immigration, and Foreign Policy, 32
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 673, 680 (1995). This policy began with the Reagan administration and continued
throughout the Bush and Clinton administrations. Id. Compare Federation for American Immigration Reform
(Advertisement), NEWSWEEK, October 18, 1999, at 60(a)-60(b) (holding that immigration is the leading cause of
population growth in the United States and that this will lead to environmental destruction) with Refugee
Consultation, 1999: Hearings on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2000 Before the Subcommittee on
Immigration of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (August 04, 1999) (statement of Julia Taft, Assistant
Secretary of State Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Department of State). (Department of State
Representative’s testimony to recent refugee Kosovars in the United States: “[t]he American people have been
reminded of what it means to be a refugee. The public’s response to the plight of the Kosovars was immediate and
overwhelming. We received tens of thousands of calls and everyone wanted to do something.”)
4

See Martin, supra note 1; see also Goodwin-Gill, supra note 2 and accompanying text. The need for refugee

deliberations is high as the number of refugees has risen. See id.
5

The term “non-refoulement” derives from the French word refouler, meaning to turn back. See Plaut, supra note 1,

at 12. Some commentators argue that the principle of non-refoulement has emerged as a generally accepted
principle of customary international law and is therefore binding on all states regardless of whether or not they have
adopted the Refugee Convention and the Protocol. See, e.g., Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Non-Refoulement and the New
Asylum Seekers, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 897, 898 (1986) (arguing that a “moral obligation to assist refugees and to
provide them with refuge or safe haven has, over time and in certain contexts, developed into a legal obligation”).
But see Kay Hailbronner, Non-Refoulement and “Humanitarian” Refugees: Customary International Law or
Wishful Legal Thinking?, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 857, 878 (1986) (finding that no international principle exists for
providing temporary refuge).
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Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention).6 The concept prohibits returning any refugee to a
country where the refugee’s life or freedom would be threatened.7 Non-refoulement is the
method by which nations, including the United States, have expressed their commitment to help
aid deserving refugees.8 The United States’ duty to non-refoulement was recently analyzed by
the Supreme Court in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre.9
6

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6261, 189

U.N.T.S. 150, 152 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; see generally NEHEMIAH
ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: ITS HISTORY, CONTENTS
AND INTERPRETATION (1953); Paul Weis, The International Protection of Refugees, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 195
(1954) (stating that the goal of the Refugee Convention is the establishment of international legal status for refugees
and the creation of international safeguards for its observation).
7

See id. Other international agreements mandating the non-refoulement concept include: (1) Article 45 of the Fourth

Geneva Convention of 1949, which prohibits refoulement to a country where there are Geneva Convention
violations, and any deportation which violates this mandate is considered a “grave breach” of the Convention. See
Karen Parker, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, in REFUGEE LAW AND POL’Y 33, 38 (Ved P.
Nanda, eds., 1989); (2) Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, 23 I.L.M. 1027, as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (June 26, 1987) (Article
3 prohibits any refoulement to a country where there are “substantial grounds” for believing the individual will be a
victim of torture); (3) European Convention on Human Rights (Article 3 interpreted by the European Commission
on Human Rights as providing a right of non-refoulement to any country where the person would be subjected to
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. See David Scott Nance, The Individual Rights to Asylum Under Article 3
of the European Convention on Human Rights, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 477
(1987).
8

See Kathleen M. Keller, Note, A Comparative and International Law Perspective on the United States

(Non)Compliance With Its Duty of Non-Refoulement, 2 YALE HUMAN RTS. & DEV. L.J. 183 (1999) (the
commitment is based on the death and imprisonment Jewish refugees faced during the Holocaust); see also Joan
Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229, 251 (1996) (explaining that the
commitment of non-refoulement was made an obligatory norm by the Refugee Convention). Professor GoodwinGill argues that, “[t]here is substantial, if not conclusive, authority that the principle is binding in all states,
independently of specific assent. State practice before 1951 is, at the least, equivocal as to whether, in that year,
Article 33 of the Convention reflected or crystallized a rule of customary international law.” GUY S. GOODWINGILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (1983).
9

119 S. Ct. 1439 (1999). The Ninth Circuit has denied a petition for review of INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre on remand

from the U.S. Supreme Court. Aguirre-Aguirre, 191 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 1999).

© The Journal of International and Comparative Law at Chicago-Kent: Volume 1, Spring 2001

56

Aguirre-Aguirre involved Juan Anibal Aguirre-Aguirre, who had entered the United
States illegally.10 At a hearing before an Immigration Judge he conceded deportability and
applied for asylum11 and withholding of deportation.12 Mr. Aguirre-Aguirre testified that in his
home country of Guatemala, he was involved in student protests against the government, which
were considered to be criminal.13 The Immigration Judge found that Mr. Aguirre-Aguirre’s acts
were essentially political in nature when balanced against the circumstances in Guatemala.14 As
10

121 F.3d 521, 522 (9th Cir. 1997).

11

The word “asylum” has its origin in the Greek language and culture and is derived from the verb “asylao,”

meaning to violate or lay waste. See Plaut, supra note 1, at 11. The adjective “asylos/asylon” represents the
opposite, namely, inviolable. See id. Today asylum generally indicates a nation where a refugee may find
temporary or permanent shelter. See id.
12

See Aguirre-Aguirre, 121 F.3d at 522. In the United States, an alien fleeing persecution has two available options.

See KAREN MUSALO, ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 84-85 (1997). The first option is asylum and the
second option is withholding of deportation or restriction on removal. See id. (Pursuant to the 1996 amendments to
the INA “withholding of deportation” has been renamed “restriction on removal.” Id. The controlling statutory
provisions for asylum are INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. 1158, and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) for restriction on removal. For purposes of
this note “restriction on removal” will be referred to as “withholding of deportation.”
An alien may apply for either withholding of removal or asylum by offering evidence of a well-founded
fear of persecution upon return to his/her own country. See Gwendolyn M. Holinka, Comment, Q-T-M-T: The
Denial of Humanitarian Relief For Aggravated Felons, 13 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 405, 414 (1999). To gain
withholding, an alien must show a greater probability of persecution than for asylum. See id. Once granted asylum,
an alien is entitled to become a lawful permanent resident of the United States and may eventually become a citizen.
See id. In comparison, with withholding of deportation the alien is not guaranteed the right to stay in the United
States. See id. However, an alien may be sent to a third country, but will not be forced to return to his/her country of
origin. See id. In addition, asylum is a discretionary remedy and withholding of deportation is mandatory once an
alien has demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution. See id.
13

See Aguirre-Aguirre, 121 F. 3d at 522. The protests involved burning several buses, after ousting the passengers,

and disrupting the government through private property damages. See id. The demonstrations were particularly
against the government’s raising of student fares on the buses and its indifference to, and possible complicity in, the
mysterious disappearances and deaths of political activists. See id.
14

See id; see also Brief of Respondent Juan Anibal Aguirre-Aguirre, INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. 1439 at 7

(1999) (No. 97-1754). The Immigration Judge rejected the INS’s suggestion that Mr. Aguirre-Aguirre was a
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a result, the Immigration Judge granted both asylum and withholding of deportation.15
On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed the Immigration Judge.16
The BIA’s rationale was that the nature of his acts in Guatemala made him unworthy of asylum
in the United States.17 Therefore, it was unnecessary to address Mr. Aguirre-Aguirre’s statutory

criminal or a terrorist based on the finding that his acts were politically motivated. See id. Guatemala is a violent
country with a long history of cruelty, civil strife, and human rights violations by the government. See id. The
Immigration Judge explained that Mr. Aguirre-Aguirre’s activities should be viewed with these circumstances in
mind. See id.
The applicant for asylum and restriction on removal bears the burden of proof for establishing eligibility for
relief. See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 12, at 878. The term “burden of proof” encompasses both the burden of
production of evidence and the burden of persuasion of the adjudicator. See id. The burden of production in asylum
cases poses special challenges, which are often not present in other domestic administrative or judicial proceedings.
See id. The events at issue occurred thousands of miles away, making it very unlikely that the applicant will be able
to produce witnesses, forensic evidence, or other documentary evidence specific to the claim. See id. For these
reasons, it is often the case that the applicant’s own testimony, if found credible, may constitute the only evidence to
prove the facts of her claim. See id. In the United States, asylum regulations provide that the applicant’s testimony,
if it is credible, “may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.” 8 C.F.R. 208.13, 208.15
(2000). Courts in the United States consider an array of factors in evaluating the credibility of testimony, including
the demeanor of the witness, the consistency, detail and specificity of the testimony, and its overall plausibility. See
NLRB v. Walton Mfg Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962) (“[W]eight is given the administrative law judge’s
determinations of credibility for the obvious reason that he or she ‘sees the witnesses and hears them testify, while
the Board and the reviewing court look only at cold records.’”); cf. Joanna Ruppel, The Need for a Benefit of the
Doubt Standard in Credibility Evaluation of Asylum Applicants, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1991)
(explaining that “the Canadian government has incorporated into the structure of refugee adjudication a policy of
giving the refugee the benefit of the doubt, not only as to the proof of her claim, but also as to her credibility.”).
15

See Aguirre-Aguirre, 121 F.3d at 522.

16

Id.

17

Id; cf. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 804 (9th Cir. 1986) (the courts stated that in determining the political

offense exception:
It is understandable that Americans are offended by the tactics used by many of those seeking to change their
governments . . . Sometimes they are employed by those whose views of the nature, importance, or relevance of
individual human life differ radically from ours. Nevertheless, it is not our place to impose our notions of civilized
strife on people who are seeking to overthrow the regimes in control of their countries in contexts and circumstances
that we have not experienced, and with which we can identify only with the greatest difficulty.)
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eligibility for asylum.18 The BIA further held that the criminal nature of his acts outweighed their
political nature and therefore, barred him from withholding of deportation.19 However, the BIA
did find that Mr. Aguirre-Aguirre did not engage in terrorist acts and that he was not a danger to
the security of the United States.20
The Ninth Circuit reversed holding that the BIA did not follow the guidelines set forth by
the Refugee Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol).21 The
circuit court relied on McMullen v. INS, a previous Ninth Circuit case.22 In McMullen, the court
applied the Convention’s exception for individuals who had committed a “serious nonpolitical
crime” to deport an individual who bombed innocent civilians.23 The Ninth Circuit, in AguirreAguirre, again applied the Refugee Convention.24 Specifically, the Aguirre-Aguirre court
18

Id.

19

Id. The BIA opinion did not give any deference to the Immigration Judge’s assessment of the historical facts, and

seemed to suggest that Mr. Aguirre-Aguirre did not deserve withholding of deportation because of his criminal
history. See Mr. Aguirre-Aguirre’s Brief, supra note 14, at 39.
20

See Aguirre-Aguirre, 121 F.3d at 522.

21

Id. at 521; see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267

[hereinafter Protocol].
22

See id. at 523 (citing McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986)).

23

McMullen, 788 F.2d at 596-597. The McMullen court considered several factors to determine whether the act

was “political”: (1) whether the act was sufficiently linked to its political objectives; (2) whether the act was
disproportionate to the political objectives; and (3) the degree of atrocity of the act.
24

See Aguirre-Aguirre, 121 F.3d at 523.

25

The mandates of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are: to provide

international protection to refugees; to seek permanent solutions for the problems of refugees; to promote the
conclusion and supervise the application of international conventions for the protection of refugees; and to promote
the implementation of measures calculated to improve the situation of refugees. Statute of the Office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Annex 5, Supp. No. 20, at 46-48, U.N. Doc.
A/1775 (1950); see also P.D. Maynard, The Legal Competence of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, 31 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 415, 415-25 (1982) (discusses the jurisdiction of the UNHCR); see generally
LOUISE W. HOLBORN, REFUGEES: A PROBLEM OF OUR TIME: THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 1951-1972 (1975) (providing a description of the early influence of the

Randi 10/6/00 6:03 PM
Deleted: (9th Cir. 1997).
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invoked the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)25 Handbook
(Handbook) recommendations in applying the “serious nonpolitical crime” exception.26 As a

UNHCR); MARJOLEINE ZIECK, UNHCR AND VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS, 59-123 (1997) (providing historical underpinnings of the creation of the UNHCR).
25

The mandates of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are: to provide

international protection to refugees; to seek permanent solutions for the problems of refugees; to promote the
conclusion and supervise the application of international conventions for the protection of refugees; and to promote
the implementation of measures calculated to improve the situation of refugees. Statute of the Office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Annex 5, Supp. No. 20, at 46-48, U.N. Doc.
A/1775 (1950); see also P.D. Maynard, The Legal Competence of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, 31 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 415, 415-25 (1982) (discusses the jurisdiction of the UNHCR); see generally
LOUISE W. HOLBORN, REFUGEES: A PROBLEM OF OUR TIME: THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 1951-1972 (1975) (providing a description of the early influence of the
UNHCR); MARJOLEINE ZIECK, UNHCR AND VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS, 59-123 (1997) (providing historical underpinnings of the creation of the UNHCR).
Today, the UNHCR cares for some 22.4 million people. See Fiscal Year 2000 Authorization for Refugee
Assistance, 1999: Before the Subcomm. on International Operations of the House of Representatives Comm. on
International Relations, 105th Cong. (March 9, 1999) (statement of Karen Koning Abuzayd, Regional
Representative, UNHCR). The United States is its largest and most reliable donor of funds. See id. Unfortunately,
more funding is needed or essentials such as food, water, shelter, primary health care and primary education will be
reduced for most refugees. See id.
26

Aguirre-Aguirre, 121 F.3d at 523-24. The recommendations to be applied to the “serious nonpolitical crime”

exception are listed in paragraphs 152 and 156 of the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status [hereinafter UN Handbook]:
[152] In determining whether an offence is “non-political” or is, on the contrary, a “political” crime, regard should
be given in the first place to its nature and purpose i.e. whether it has been committed out of genuine political
motives and not merely for personal reasons or gain. There should also be a close and direct causal link between the
crime committed and its alleged political purpose and object. The political element of the offence should also
outweigh its common-law character. This would not be the case if the acts committed are grossly out of proportion
to the alleged objective. The political nature of the offence is also more difficult to accept if it involves acts of an
atrocious nature.
[156] [I]n applying this exclusion clause, it is also necessary to strike a balance between the nature of the offence
presumed to have been committed by the applicant and the degree of persecution feared. If a person has wellfounded fear of very severe persecution, e.g. persecution endangering his life or freedom, a crime must be very
grave in order to exclude him. If the persecution feared is less serious, it will be necessary to have regard to the
nature of the crime or crimes presumed to have been committed in order to establish whether the applicant is not in
reality a fugitive from justice or whether his criminal character does not outweigh his character as a bona fide
refugee.
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result, the Ninth Circuit found that Mr. Aguirre-Aguirre’s acts were politically motivated and not
serious enough for deportation when balanced against the threat he faced in Guatemala.27
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, in part by giving the BIA’s
decision deference, and in part through its conclusion that the Handbook is not binding on the
Attorney General, BIA, or U.S. courts.28 The Supreme Court held that an alien who has
committed a “serious nonpolitical crime” is ineligible for withholding of deportation.29 In
addition, the Court explained that this determination does not require balancing the alien’s
criminal acts against the risk of persecution the alien would face if returned to his/her home
country.30 The Court further held that the BIA was not required to expressly consider the
atrociousness of Aguirre’s acts in determining eligibility for withholding of deportation.31
This Comment examines the factors considered in determining the “serious nonpolitical

The Ninth Circuit has been praised for its references to the Handbook. See, e.g., Jineki C. Butler, Comment, A
Country With a Conscience? The Ninth Circuit Develops a Global Perspective of Refugee Law, 20 MD. J. INT’L L.
& TRADE 257, 276 (1996) (“The Ninth Circuit has prioritized the goals of the refugee statute above the narrow
interpretations given it by the Supreme Court. In doing so, it has neutralized the legal technicalities which often
plague the immigration system and has strengthened the commitment to human rights obligations the United States
undertook 29 years ago”); Jennifer A. Rosenfield, Comment, Immigration Law—Religious Conscientious
Objectors—Ninth Circuit Holding Supports United States’ Commitment to United Nations Protocol, Canas-Segovia
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990), 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV.
390, 407 (1991) (“By adopting the Handbook’s guidance, the Ninth Circuit endorsed an interpretation of the
Refugee Act which conforms to the United Nations Protocol.”).
27

See Aguirre-Aguirre, 121 F.3d at 524. The Ninth Circuit stated that “[w]hen you are dealing with an ass it may be

necessary to move a beast by a blow on a sensitive part even though what you want to move are the feet.” Id. at
524-25.
28

See Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. at 1442.

29

See id.

30

See Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. at 1442. However, the Supreme Court has ignored international law by not

applying a balancing test that would consider the potential of persecution if the asylum seeker were to be returned.
See Keller, supra note 8, at 183.
31

See id.
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crime” exception to withholding of deportation in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre. First, this Comment will present an overview of withholding of
deportation in the United States. Next, this Comment explores the BIA’s interpretation of
“serious nonpolitical crimes” and the deference it is given by the courts. This Comment
examines the use of the Handbook by the BIA and the courts in determining questions of
domestic law in the United States. In addition, this Comment examines the use of the Handbook
at an international level. Next, this Comment analyzes INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre and the likely
direct impact it will have on future withholding of deportation cases. This Comment concludes
that the Court improperly decided Aguirre-Aguirre and urges the BIA and the courts to consider
a “well-founded” fear of persecution and atrociousness in determining whether an act warrants
an exclusion of withholding of deportation.
I. Withholding of Deportation in the United States
A. Historical Overview
The United States’ recognition of protecting political asylum seekers from persecution
dates back to 1875, when Congress excluded criminals from the lenient immigration policy but
created an exception for aliens convicted of political crimes.32 In 1950, Congress passed the
Internal Security Act,33 which prevented deportation of an alien to any country where the alien
would be subject to physical persecution.34 In 1952, Congress passed section 243(h) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),35 which authorized the U.S. Attorney General to

32

See Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477. The exclusion provision covered “persons who were

undergoing a sentence for conviction in their own country of felonious crimes other than political or growing out of
or the result of such political offenses.” Id.
33

Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010.

34

See id.

35

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, ch. 477, §243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 [hereinafter INA].
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withhold the deportation of an alien who was subject to physical persecution in his homeland.36
Under the 1952 INA, the Attorney General had discretionary authority to decline deportation of
an alien from the United States.37
Strict limiting principles, however, developed in accepting aliens.38 In fact, the exercise
of discretion was limited to cases of clear probability of persecution, where the clear probability
standard was applied stringently.39 In 1968, the United States acceded to the Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees.40 This resulted in the United States binding itself to Articles 2 through
34 of the Refugee Convention.41 As Article 33 of the Refugee Convention42 prevents returning a
refugee to any country where the refugee’s life or freedom is threatened,43 this accession

36

See id.

37

See INA, supra note 35. In 1965, the term “physical persecution” was replaced by “persecution on account of

race, religion, or political opinion.” See In re Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564 (BIA 1967). This change was considered by
Congress to be in harmony with the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, even though the
United States had not formally acceded to the Convention. See id.
38

See Arthur Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH. J. L.

REF. 243, 244-246 (1984).
39

See id. The clear probability standard was reviewable by courts only for administrative abuse of discretion. See

id. The standard of review was also deferential, “[t]he Attorney General’s . . . ungenerous interpretation of the law
in a particular case was deemed insufficient cause to hold that he had abused his discretion.” Id.
40

See Protocol, supra note 22; see generally MUSALO ET AL., supra note 12, at 60-68.

41

See Refugee Convention, supra note 6. Article 1 of the Protocol obligates the parties “to apply articles 2 to 34

inclusive to the Convention to refugees as . . . defined.” Protocol, supra note 22.
41

See Refugee Convention, supra note 6. Article 1 of the Protocol obligates the parties “to apply articles 2 to 34

inclusive to the Convention to refugees as . . . defined.” Protocol, supra note 22.
42

United States v. Stevic held that “Article 33 of the Convention imposes an absolute obligation upon the United

States to conform United States domestic law to the Protocol.” 467 U.S. 407, 409 (1984). Domestic legislation
specifically implements Article 33 of the Protocol. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994) (definition of “refugee”
adopted from Protocol); § 1158(a) (asylum); § 1253(h) (withholding of deportation).
43

Article 33.1 provides as follows: “[N]o Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any

manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his

Randi 10/7/00 1:01 PM
Deleted: Karen Musalo et al, Refugee Law
and Policy 60-68.
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removed the Attorney General’s discretion to grant relief from deportation.44
It was not until the Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act),45 which amended INA section
243(h), that Congress mandated and established formal procedures for granting withholding of
deportation.46 As a result, the United States could not deport an alien whose life or freedom
would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.47 The legislative history of the Refugee Act explains that one of
Congress’ primary purposes was to bring the United States refugee law into conformance with

race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Refugee Convention, supra
note 6, art. 33.1.
44

See Elwin Griffith, Problems of Interpretation in Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Proceedings Under the

Immigration and Nationality Act, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 255, 256 (1996) (explaining the removal of
the Attorney General’s discretion in deportation cases).
45

Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(f), 94 Stat. 102 [hereinafter Refugee Act]. See Ming v. Marks,

367 F. Supp. 673, 676-679 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 505 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911 (1975)
(discussion of the history and context underlying the United States’ accession to the Protocol); see also generally
Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
9 (1981); David A. Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT’L LEGAL STUD.
91; Katherine S. Dodge, Eligibility for Withholding of Deportation: The Alien’s Burden Under the 1980 Refugee
Act, Stevic v. Sava, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (1983) (explaining that the purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980
was to “clarify procedures for admitting refugees” and ensure compliance with international standards of refugee
protection).
46

See Refugee Act supra note 46; see also Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A

Case Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 438-39 (1992) (maintaining that the Refugee Act was enacted to achieve uniform, fair
and impartial asylum procedures); [William Sanchez & Adalsinda Lomangino, Political Asylum and Other Forms of
Relief, 66 FLA. B.J. 18, 18 (1992) (claiming that the Refugee Act created refugee and asylum procedures in an
attempt to end the ad hoc treatment of such applications); Michelle N. Lewis, Note, The Political-Offense Exception:
Reconciling the Tension Between Human Rights and International Public Order, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 585,
599 (1995) (explaining that prior to the Refugee Act, the Attorney General had complete discretion over asylum.]
47

See Refugee Act supra note 46.
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the Protocol.48 The language of amended section 243(h) substantially reflected the
“nonrefoulement provision” in Article 33 of the Convention.49 Today, withholding of
deportation is codified under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (IIRIRA).50

48

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987). See also United States v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 426 (1984)

(citing Rosenberg v. Yee Chin Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 52 (1971) (“[a]lthough the language through which Congress has
implemented this policy . . . has changed slightly from time to time, the basic policy has remained constant—to
provide a haven for homeless refugees and to fulfill American responsibilities in connection with the International
Refugee Organization of the United Nations.”).)
49

See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436; see also Stevic, 467 U.S. at 421 n.15 (1984)

(“Section 203(e) of the Refugee Act of 1980 amended the language of § 243(h), basically conforming it to the
language of Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol.”). Other important textual changes include (1) language from
Convention Article 33 (“life or freedom would be threatened”) was adopted into the eligibility standard; and (2) the
protected classes were expanded to include “nationality” and “membership in a particular social group. Id.
The legislative history of the Refugee Act is replete with praise for its humanitarian purposes. See 126
CONG. REC. 4,501 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Rodino). According to Representative Rodino, the Refugee Act
“confirms what this Government and the American people are all about . . . [b]y their deep dedication and untiring
efforts, the United States once again has demonstrated its concern for the homeless, the defenseless, and the
persecuted peoples who fall victim to tyrannical and oppressive governmental regimes.” Id; see also H.R. REP.
NO. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1980); S REP. NO. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 19 (1980).
50

Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1994 and Supp.III 1997)).

The prior and new provisions are the same, although the new provision reflects the fact that an alien is now subject
to “removal” from the U.S. rather than deportation. See id. The most noticeable difference between the two
provisions is the use of the word “may” rather than “shall.” See id. Section 1231(b)(3) states that the Attorney
General “may not remove an alien,” while § 1253(h)(2) stated that the Attorney General “shall not deport or return
any alien.” Id. It is highly unlikely that Congress intended to change the mandatory nature of the prior provision.
See Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. et al., Immigration Legislation Handbook 9-14 (1999). See also IIRIRA Legislative
History: H.R. REP. NO. 104-2202, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (May 7, 1996).; H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-828, 104th
Cong. 2d Sess. (Sept. 24, 1996); S. REP. NO. 104-249, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (Apr. 10, 1996); 142 CONG. REC.
S4730-01, § 150 (May 6, 1996); 142 CONG. REC. H2378-05, § 309 (Mar. 19, 1996) at H10,841-02. However,
some have called for the repeal of IIRIRA. See Bishop DiMarzio, note 3, stating that:
[t]he 1996 law created the procedure of expedited removal, which empowers low-level Immigration and
Naturalization inspectors summarily to remove potential asylum-seekers without a hearing before an immigration
judge. Under this procedure, more than 76,000 individuals were removed from the United States during Fiscal Year
1998. While lack of sufficient data and accessibility to interviews conducted by inspectors prevents specific
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B. The Entanglement of Procuring Withholding of Deportation
Within the Executive Branch, two administrative agencies of the Department of Justice,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)51 and the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (EOIR),52 share responsibilities in the asylum process.53 The INS serves as the
immigration enforcement arm of the Executive Branch.54 To deport an alien, the INS must
commence deportation proceedings in the immigration court, the trial court of the EOIR.55 If the
alien has any claim to relief from deportation, such as withholding of deportation, he or she must
present it in the deportation proceedings.56 If the claim is unsuccessful, the claimant may appeal

conclusions, it is likely that in the past few years the United States has returned to their persecutors asylum-seekers
with valid claims to protection.
51

See Immigration and Naturalization Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 103(a), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended

at 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994 and Supp.III 1997)).
52

See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.0-3.38 (1998).

53

See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (1998). Senator Spencer Abraham introduced S. 1563, the INS Reform and Border

Security Act of 1999 on August 5, 1999. See Immigration Law Advisory 4-6 (October, 1999). This would establish
within the Department of Justice an Immigration Affairs Agency, consisting of the Office of the Associate Attorney
General for Immigration Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration Services and Adjudications, and the Bureau of
Enforcement and Border Affairs. See id. Similar legislation is pending in the House of Representatives. See id.
54

8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994 and Supp.III 1997). Upon locating an alien in the United States in contravention of the

Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), the INS may seek to deport or grant asylum or other relief to that person.
Id.
55

A deportable alien is one who has entered the country before coming to the attention of the INS. See INA, § 241,

8 U.S.C. § 1227 (1998). An excludable alien, on the other hand, has not entered and ordinarily is refused entry to
the United States at the border. See id. § 1101(a)(13) (1988); see also, e.g., Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958). The
legal rights of deportable and excludable aliens differ in several ways. See Landon v. Plasecia, 459 U.S. 21, 25-28
(1982). A United States District Court may review the INS’s determination that an alien is excludable in habeas
corpus proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b). In contrast, final deportation orders may be appealed only to the
federal courts of appeals. See id.
56

See supra note 56.
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to the Board of Immigration Appeals57 and ultimately to a United States Court of Appeals.58 The
EOIR serves as the adjudicatory arm of the Executive Branch on immigration matters.59
II. The BIA and its Deference by the Courts
A. Inconsistent Determinations with the “Serious Nonpolitical Crime” Exception
1. The BIA’s Lack of Deference in Determining a “Serious Nonpolitical Crime”
Without Factoring a Well-Founded Fear of Persecution
The United States provides for some exceptions to the obligation of withholding of
deportation, including when an alien has committed a “serious nonpolitical crime” outside the
United States before arriving in the United States.60 The purpose of this exception is two-fold.61
First, the “serious nonpolitical crime” exception avoids granting refugee status to persons who
might jeopardize the internal security of asylum countries.62 Secondly, the exception prevents
57

See supra note 56. The BIA, as an administrative appeals body, has three over-lapping responsibilities. First, the

BIA must develop appropriate standards for adjudication where statutes, regulations, and case law do not provide
adequate guidance and must adapt those standards to relevant changes in the law. Second, the BIA should set
standards that facilitate judicial review and conform its judgments to court decisions that reverse or modify a BIA
determination. Third, the BIA must maintain uniformity, fairness, and legality in decision-making within the
immigration bureaucracy by ensuring that standards and any new subsequent modifications to them are properly
implemented by the officials under its jurisdiction. See Derek Smith, Note, A Refugee By Any Other Name: An
Examination of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ Action in Asylum Cases, 75 VA. L. REV. 681, 682 (1989).
58

See supra note 56.

59

See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.0-3.38 (1998).

59

See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.0-3.38 (1998).

60

See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (Supp.III 1997) (previously codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (1994). Other

exceptions include when:
(i) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of an individual because of the
individual’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; (ii) the alien,
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime is a danger to the community of the United
States; . . . (iv) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States.
61

J. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 214 (1991).

62

See id.; See also Matter of Frentescu, 18 I & N Dec. 244 (BIA 1982) (the most important factor when considering

this exception is whether the applicant will be a danger to the community).
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fugitives from abusing the justice system.63
With regard to the “serious nonpolitical crime” exception to withholding of deportation,
the first reported decision came in Matter of Rodriguez-Palma.64 In this case, the Board had to
decide whether a Cuban national had committed a “serious nonpolitical crime” in Cuba before
entering the United States.65 The BIA concluded that Rodriguez-Palma had committed a “serious
nonpolitical crime.”66 In reaching this determination, the BIA referred to the Handbook for an
interpretation of the meaning and application of the terms used in the Protocol.67 The BIA noted
that the Conference Report, which accompanied the final version of the Refugee Act, indicated
that Congress intended that INA section 1253(h), which deals with the “serious nonpolitical
crime” exception, be construed consistently with the Protocol.68 Thus, the BIA first looked to
the Protocol for guidance as to the meaning of the term.69 Finding none, the BIA found several

63

A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 290 (1966); compare

Hathaway, supra note 62 at 221 (Convention Article 1(F)(b) disallows the claims of persons who seek to escape
legitimate criminal liability) with Evangeline G. Abriel, The Effect of Criminal Conduct Upon Refugee and Asylum
Status, 3 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 359, 371-72 (1996) (the conviction of a particular crime should be considered
with other mitigating factors such as the expected persecution in the applicant’s country).
64

17 I & N Dec. 465 (BIA 1980).

65

See id. at 466. In 1980, there was a massive influx of Cuban refugees to the United States who were allowed to

leave Cuba through the port of Mariel. See Ortiz-Miranda, supra note 3, at 681. These refugees were to remain in
the United States as a result of legislation Congress enacted in 1966 in response to the rise of communist control of
Cuba. See id. The legislation authorized the attorney general to grant permanent residency to any native or citizen
of Cuba who was admitted or paroled into the United States after January 1, 1959, and had been physically present
in the United States for at least one year. See Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161
(1966).
66

Rodriguez-Palma, 17 I & N Dec. at 469.

67

See id. at 468.

68

See id.

69

See id.
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Handbook provisions to be instructive.70 The Handbook explains that to exclude persons who
have demonstrated a justified fear of severe persecution, any crimes committed in a foreign
country must be extremely grave.71 However, the BIA decided that even if this standard was
adopted and applied to Rodriguez-Palma, it would not have had an affect on its decision.72
Shortly thereafter, the BIA considered the same issue in Matter of Ballester-Garcia,
another Cuban national case.73 Here, the Board explained that there were serious reasons to
believe that the “serious nonpolitical crime” exception applies, regardless of whether the BIA
applies the traditional consensus approach or the Rodriguez-Palma balancing test.74 These two
cases are the closest the BIA has come to a precedent decision on the question of whether the
risk of the persecution is considered in applying the serious nonpolitical crime exception.75
The BIA decision in Matter of Rodriguez-Coto76, however, casts doubt on these two
decisions. At issue was whether exclusion proceedings could be reopened to consider additional

70

See id. The BIA referred to paragraphs 155 and 156 of the UN Handbook:

[155] [W]hat constitutes a “serious” non-political crime for the purposes of this exclusion clause is difficult to
define, especially since the term “crime” has different connotations in different legal systems. In some countries the
word “crime” denotes only offences of a serious character. In other countries it may comprise anything from petty
larceny to murder. In the present context, however, a “serious” crime must be a capital crime or a very grave
punishable act. Minor offences punishable by moderate sentences are not grounds for exclusion under article 1F(b)
even if technically referred to as “crimes” in the penal law of the country concerned.
See also UN Handbook, supra note 25, at paragraph 156.
71

See id.

72

See id. at 470.

73

17 I & N Dec. 592 (BIA 1980).

74

See id. at 596.

75

Commentators have also argued that the BIA’s decisions in Rodriguez-Palma and Ballester-Garcia misinterpreted

the asylum statute by equating the grounds of denial for both asylum and withholding of deportation. See Robert G.
Rooney, Note, The Power To Pretermit an Application For Asylum: Improper Policy For American Asylum Law, 5
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 641, 660 (1991). The result has been a blurred distinction between the requirements for
allowing or denying each. See id.
76

19 I & N Dec. 208 (BIA 1985).
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evidence regarding applications for asylum and withholding of deportation.77 Rodriguez-Coto
argued that additional evidence of a fear of persecution arising from his membership in a
particular social group made him eligible for asylum and/or withholding of deportation.78 The
BIA rejected Rodriguez-Coto’s argument.79 In doing so, the BIA also rejected an interpretation
of the phrases “particularly serious crime” and “serious nonpolitical crime” in sections
243(h)(2)(B) and (C), which would vary with the nature of evidence of persecution.80 In a onesentence footnote the BIA dismissed its prior precedent decisions, Rodriguez-Palma and
Ballester-Garcia, which presented persecution of the alien as a factor in evaluating the “serious
nonpolitical crime” exception.81 The Board arrived at this conclusion even though the case did
not present a serious nonpolitical crime issue.82 In fact, the issue was whether the alien’s
behavior created a danger to the U.S. community.83

77

See Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I & N Dec. at 208.

78

See id. at 209.

79

See id.

80

See id.

81

See id., n. 2. (“[W]e did not find it necessary to resolve this issue in Matter of Rodriguez-Palma . . . and Ballester-

Garcia . . . but do so here.”)
82

See id. at 208. Many circuit court cases have criticized and reversed the BIA for the poor quality of its decision-

making and faulty reasoning and analysis. See Marquez v. INS, 105 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 1997) (faulting BIA for
disorganization of its opinion and “twisted strands” of reasoning; the BIA must announce its decision in terms
sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive it has heard and thought and not merely reacted); Davila-Bardales
v. INS, 27 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994) (the BIA departed significantly from prior unpublished decisions treating the
identical issue); Espinoza v. INS, 991 F.2d 1294, 1300-01 (7th Cir. 1993) (BIA’s decision rested on nothing but
speculation without evidence to support it; the BIA relied on an incomplete record); Diaz-Resendiz v. INS, 960 F.2d
493, 495, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1992) (the BIA decision departed from established precedent without a reasoned
explanation; BIA failed to consider meaningfully all relevant factors, or sufficiently articulate its reasons); MartinezBenitez v. INS, 956 F.2d 1053, 1055 (11th Cir. 1992) (reversing BIA for failing to evaluate the nature and
underlying circumstances of the applicant’s conviction before denying asylum).
83

See 19 I & N at 208.
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After the Rodriguez-Coto decision, the INS published asylum regulations that set forth an
interpretation of the “serious nonpolitical crime” exception.84 The INS promulgated that, in
order to be consistent with the Refugee Convention and the Protocol, the “serious nonpolitical
crime” standard was to be applied in asylum cases with full consideration of the totality of
circumstances and equities on a case-by-case basis.85 Because every asylum application is also
considered to be an application for withholding of deportation, full consideration would also
apply to withholding of deportation.86
2. Atrociousness as a Determining Factor
The Handbook notes that in determining whether an offense is “non-political,” an
adjudicator should take into account whether the act was grossly out of proportion to the
objective or atrocious.87 The BIA applied this line of reasoning in Matter of McMullen.88
84

See 53 Fed. Reg. 11300-11301 (April 6, 1988). In Andriasian v. INS 180 F.3d 1033, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999), the

Ninth Circuit noted the BIA’s failure to abide by its own regulations. The court stated:
84

See 53 Fed. Reg. 11300-11301 (April 6, 1988). In Andriasian v. INS 180 F.3d 1033, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999), the

Ninth Circuit noted the BIA’s failure to abide by its own regulations. The court stated:
In denying [the] request for asylum, however, the BIA did not determine that the regulation permitted denial of
asylum; rather, it failed even to consider or apply the regulation governing discretionary denials on account of a
petitioner's opportunity to reside elsewhere. It is the failure to abide by its own regulations that renders the BIA’s
decision ‘contrary to law,’ Lopez-Galarza v. INS, 99 F.3d at 960 (quoting Padilla-Agustin v. INS, 21 F.3d 970, 973
(9th Cir. 1994)), and therefore an abuse of discretion. For while, in the absence of any regulatory guide, the BIA’s
authority to consider various factors in exercising its discretion would be relatively unconstrained, ‘[i]t is a wellknown maxim that agencies must comply with their own regulations.’ Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 743 F.2d 1307,
1310 (9th Cir. 1984).
85
See Fed. Reg. 11300-11301. The INS stated that:
[E]vidence of the commission of such non-political crimes will now be a discretionary factor to be considered
together with the totality of circumstances and equities on a case-by-case basis consistent with the proper intent of
the Refugee Act of 1980 as well as the 1951 U.S. Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees. The ‘equities’ in any particular case would include the persecution an applicant faces upon forced return
to his or her country. The ‘totality of the circumstances’ would include the political purposes of the act and the
political and social conditions in the home country at the time of the alleged crime. Id.
86

See Stevic, 467 U.S. at 420 n. 13; 8 CFR 208.3(b)(2000).

87

See UN Handbook, paragraph 152.

88

19 I. & N. Dec. 90 (BIA 1984), aff’d, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986). The matter involved a native and citizen of

the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. See id. at 91. The BIA did not explicitly refer to the UN
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McMullen argued that he would be subject to persecution if deported.89 The issue, then, was
whether this made him eligible for either asylum or withholding of deportation.90 The BIA
found, among others, that McMullen’s participation in terrorist use of explosives and his
participation in a campaign of violence randomly directed against civilians represented acts of an
atrocious nature.91 As such, the acts were out of proportion with McMullen’s political goal
making him ineligible for both asylum and withholding of deportation.92 In evaluating the
political nature of the crime, the BIA determined that the political aspect of the offense
outweighed its common-law character.93 The BIA further explained that this would not be the
case if the crime was grossly out of proportion to the political objective or if it involved acts of
an atrocious nature.94
An understanding of the limits of the atrociousness factor can be found in Matter of
Rodriguez-Majano.95 Rodriguez-Majano contended that his activities, which occurred during his
country’s civil war, did not constitute persecution or assistance of persecution.96 These activities
included the destruction of property and the forcible recruiting and disciplining of civilian

Handbook for guidance. See id. For an analysis and discussion of McMullen see generally Timothy P. McElduff,
Jr., In Re McMullen and the Supplementary Extradition Treaty: An Unconstitutional Bill of Attainder, 11 N.Y.
INT’L L. REV. 139 (1998); Katherine M. Sheehan, Note, And Then There Was One: Peter Gabriel John
McMullen’s Bill of Attainder Challenge to the U.K.-U.S. Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 57 ALB. L. REV. 235
(1993).
89

See McMullen, 19 I & N Dec. at 92.

90

See id.

91

See id. at 98.

92

See id. at 95. (McMullen’s political goal was to unify Ireland).

93

See id. at 97-98.

94

See id.

95

19 I & N Dec. 811, 815-16 (BIA 1988).

96

See id. at 812 (the activities and civil war took place in the country of El Salvador).
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members.97 The BIA held that these actions were typical within the nature of civil wars.98
B. Chevron and the “Serious Nonpolitical Crime”
Deference to administrative agencies has been strengthened through the judicial
implementation of the Chevron doctrine.99 The Chevron doctrine explains that when reviewing
an agency’s statutory construction, a court should confront two questions:100 First, whether
Congress has directly spoken on the precise question at issue,101 and second, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the issue at hand, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on permissible construction of the statute.102 When answering these
questions, considerable weight should be given to the agency’s construction of a statute for

97

See id.

98

See id. at 816; In Matter of Izatula, 20 I & N Dec. 149, 152-53 (BIA 1990), the BIA conceded that violent actions

may be the only option for people seeking to change the political structure of their governments. See also Matter of
Sanchez and Escobar, 19 I. & N. Dec. 276 (BIA 1985); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985) (all
holding that harm resulting from generalized civil strife is not persecution.) See also Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692
F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1982).
99

Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 860 (1984) (holding that the

Environmental Protection Agency’s regulation allowing states to treat all pollution-emitting devices within the same
industrial grouping as though they were encased within one category was based on a permissible construction of the
term “source” in the Clean Air Act Amendments); cf. Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study
of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG.. 1, 60 (1998) (the Chevron test
withstands challenges by contextual, political and interpretive critiques in U.S. Courts of Appeals).
100

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.

101

See id; cf. Note, A Pragmatic Approach To Chevron, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1739-40 (in addition to whether

the language is ambiguous courts should identify the type of indeterminacy and thus the corresponding message
regarding the scope of authority given to the agency).
102

See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843. See A Pragmatic Approach to Chevron, supra note 101, at 1740 (in addition

to whether the agency acted reasonably, the court should determine whether the agency interpretation falls within
the scope of agency authority determined in question one).
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which it is entrusted to administer.103 The judiciary, however, is the final authority on issues
regarding statutory construction.104 As a result, courts must reject administrative constructions
that are contrary to clear Congressional intent.105
The Chevron doctrine’s importance in the immigration law context was presented in INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca.106 Here, the INS argued that the Court should defer to the agency’s
interpretation of the INA as amended by the Refugee Act.107 The Cardoza-Fonseca Court
rejected the INS’ argument and relied on the Chevron doctrine to emphasize that courts are the
final authority on issues of statutory construction.108 The Court explained that the issue before it
was purely one of statutory construction and that the courts needed to use “traditional tools” such
as language and legislative history of the statute.109 In reviewing these sources, the CardozaFonseca Court concluded that Congress did not intend to require asylum-seekers to establish a
clear probability of persecution.110 Instead, the Court held that Congress intended the asylum-

103

See id. at 844; see also John G. Osborn, Legal Philosophy and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory

Interpretation, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115, 158 (1999) (Supreme Court’s historic approach to agency
interpretation indicate a tension between natural law and legal positivism).
104

See id. at 843 n.9.

105

See id.

106

480 U.S. 421 (1987).

107

See id. at 445.

108

See id. at 447-48.

109

See id. at 446; see also Federal Labor Relations Authority v. Aberdeen Proving Ground, 495 U.S. 409, 414

(1988) (citing Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983)) (courts should not
rubber stamp administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the
congressional policy underlying a statute); Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230
(1986) (reviewing agency interpretation as “a purely legal question of statutory interpretation”).
110

See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446. For a discussion of the standard applied by the Board of Immigration

Appeals and lower courts in response to Cardoza-Fonseca, see THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A.
MARTIN, Immigration: Process and Policy 759-66; see also Michael E. Mangelson, Three Years After Matter of
Mogharrabi: Is a “Reasonable Person” Test the Answer to the Confusing “Well-Founded Fear of Persecution”
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seeker to satisfy a more generous standard to be granted asylum.111
The Chevron doctrine was narrowed in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital.112 In
Bowen, the issue was whether the Secretary of Health and Human Service could reissue a 1981
wage-index rule to promulgate retroactive cost limits.113 The Court rejected the validity of the
Secretary’s act.114 The Court explained that an agency is not entitled to deference when its
interpretation is presented for the first time as a litigation position.115 Such a litigation position is
one that is "wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice."116 As a
result, an agency’s decision will be given deference under Chevron, unless its interpretation is

Standard in Asylum Cases?, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1123 (stating that “well-founded fear of persecution” based on
reasonable person standard substantially conforms to UN Protocol and will protect bona fide refugees).
111

See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446. As there was clear congressional intent on the question, the Court did not

proceed to the second step of the Chevron inquiry on whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute was
reasonable. See id. at 443-49; see also In the Matter of the Extradition of Francisco Pazienza, 619 F. Supp. 611, 619
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (the task of defining what is a political offense is left to the judiciary).
112

488 U.S. 204, 212-213 (1988); see also Florida Manufactured Hous. Ass'n v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1574 (11th

Cir. 1995) (no deference to changed interpretation when the new interpretation is a mere litigation position); USX
Corp. v. office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 978 F.2d 656, 658 (11th Cir. 1992) (no deference to agency’s
litigating position absent prior interpretation); Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind
Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. REG. 1, 60-61 (1990) (Litigation positions do not and should not receive
deference.).
113

Bowen, 488 U.S. at 206.

114

See id. at 216. Compare Richard J. Wolf, Judicial Review of Retroactive Rulemaking: Has Georgetown

Neglected The Plastic Remedies?, 68 U. L.Q.157 (1990) (retroactive rules are a valid form of agency rulemaking
under the Administrative Procedure Act) with David M. Gossett, Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency
Interpretations of Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.681, 682 (1997) (courts give equal deference to revised agency
interpretations of statutes as to initial interpretations).
115

See id. at 212-13.

116

See id. at 209-13.
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presented for the first time, in which case it is not entitled to deference.117
The Supreme Court expanded the Chevron doctrine in immigration cases, however, in
INS v. Abudu.118 Here, Abudu sought reopening of his deportation case to apply for asylum and
withholding of deportation.119 He wanted to prove that he had a well-founded fear of persecution
were he to be returned to his native country.120 The Abudu Court held that a court generally must
apply a deferential abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the BIA’s denial of a motion to
reopen when the applicant fails to reasonably explain the reason for not applying for relief.121 In
addition, the Abudu Court explained that since INS exercises "especially sensitive political
functions that implicate questions of foreign relations [deference to] agency decisions . . .
[applies] with even greater force in the INS context."122

117

See id. at 212-13; see also William V. Luneburg, Retroactivity and Administrative Rulemaking, 1991 DUKE L.J.

106, 138 (1991) (“Bowen negates reasonable agency assertions of a particular type of power unless Congress has
expressly (or “clearly”) granted that authority to the agency.”).
118

485 U.S. 94 (1988).

119

See id. at 97.

120

See id.

121

See id. at 105-08.

121

See id. at 105-08.

122

Id. at 110. The concept of giving greater deference to the Executive Branch lies in the Plenary Doctrine. This

Doctrine shield’s the Executive Branch’s immigration decisions from meaningful judicial review. See also e.g.,
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (holding that Congress constitutionally may make distinctions between
illegitimate “alien” children seeking preference for admission depending on whether the natural father or mother is
legally in the country); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) (holding that Congress constitutionally may
impose conditions on an “alien’s” eligibility for federal medical insurance); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
765-70, 766 & n.6 (1972) (holding that Congress constitutionally may bestow Attorney General with discretion to
deny visa to “alien” advocating communism); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (holding that Congress
could allow deportation of “alien” because of past membership in Communist party). See generally Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J.545, 550-60 (1990) (discussing history and impact of Plenary Power Doctrine). The
Supreme Court first invoked the Doctrine in the late 1800’s to preclude judicial review of racist immigration laws.
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III. The Handbook’s Struggle for Acceptance
A. The Inconsistent Use of the Handbook in the United States
The Supreme Court first recognized international law as early as 1793 in Chisholm v.
Georgia.123 The Court observed that the United States became “amenable to the law of nations”
when it came into being.124 Although the Constitution gives Congress the power to “define and
punish . . . offenses against the Law of Nations”125 and identifies treaties as part of the “supreme
Law of the Land,”126 the federal courts have the task of defining the role of international law in
the U.S. legal system.127 The Court has, thus, interpreted domestic legislation in a way that is
consistent with international obligations.128 The Court recognizes that an act of Congress should

See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705-32 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581,
609-11 (1889), Justice Field emphasized that if Congress:
[c]onsiders the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be
dangerous to its peace and security . . . its determination is conclusive upon the Judiciary . . . The power of exclusion
of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those
sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the
government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one . . . If
there be any just ground of complaint . . . it must be made to the political department of our government, which is
alone competent to act upon the subject.
Justice Frankfurter captured the Plenary Power Doctrine by stating that “[W]hether immigration laws have
been crude and cruel, whether they may have reflected xenophobia in general or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism,
the responsibility belongs to the Congress.” Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
123

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).

124

See id. at 474. See also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (“[W]hen the United States declared

their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations in its modern state of purity and refinement.”).
125

U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 10.

125

U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 10.

126

Id. at art. VI, cl. 2.

127

Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39 (1994) (finding that the
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Deleted: .

Supreme Court enforces the obligations stemming from international law some of the time).
128

See id.

129

See Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804):
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not be construed in a manner that would violate international law if other constructions
remained.129 In fact, domestic law may supersede international obligations only by express
abrogation,130 or by subsequent legislation that conflicts irrevocably with international
obligations.131
In refugee law, neither the Refugee Convention nor the Protocol "create a centralized
status determination body nor prescribed detailed guidelines for implementation by national
states."132 As a result, the UNHCR issued the Handbook to promote greater uniformity in
national practice and to ensure that fundamental refugee protections are respected.133 The United
States, however, has applied the guidelines set forth in the Handbook inconsistently.134
1. The Inconsistency in the BIA
Although the BIA did not use the Handbook with respect to Aguirre-Aguirre and the

129

See Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804):

It has also been observed that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the Law of Nations, if any
other possible construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect
neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the Law of Nations as understood in this country.
See also Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508-511 (1947); Cook v.
United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-120 (1933).
130

See Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 538 (1884) (“[B]ut even in the cases of statutes, whose repeal or

modification involves no question of good faith with the government or people of other countries, the rule is well
settled that repeals by implication are not favored, and are never admitted where the former can stand with the new
act.”).
131

See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (“[a]n act of congress, which must comply with the Constitution, is on

a full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which is subsequent in time is subsequent in time is inconsistent
with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null”).
132

Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (1997).

133

See id.

134

See id.135 Ira J. Kurzban, Kurzban’s Immigration Law Sourcebook, 247 (6th ed. 1998). See also INS Basic Law

Manual, which advises asylum officers that while the UN Handbook is “not legally binding,” it may be cited where
it “does not conflict with United States law or regulations.” United States Department of Justice Immigration and
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“serious nonpolitical crime” exception, the BIA has used it when interpreting other areas of
refugee law.135 Recently, in Matter of N-M-A,136 the BIA used Handbook paragraph 135 to
determine a well-founded fear of persecution from a changed regime.137 The BIA also used
paragraph 136 of the Handbook for an exception to the cessation provision,138 which “mirrored
the language of Article 1C(5) of the Convention.”139 In Matter of S-M-J, another recent BIA
case,140 the BIA also referred to the Handbook in its determinations.141 First it used paragraph 42
of the Handbook to interpret the context of an asylum applicant’s statements.142 Secondly, the
BIA referred to paragraphs 205(a)(i)-(iii), 203 and 204 of the Handbook in determining the role
of the asylum applicant and the benefit of doubt the BIA should have with regard to the
applicant’s statements.143 Therefore, the BIA has consulted the Handbook when dealing with
issues of refugee law.144

Naturalization Service, Basic Law Manual: U.S. Law and INS Refugee Asylum Adjudications ch. II.B, reprinted in
8 Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure, Special Supplement 1995.
135

Ira J. Kurzban, Kurzban’s Immigration Law Sourcebook, 247 (6th ed. 1998). See also INS Basic Law Manual,

which advises asylum officers that while the UN Handbook is “not legally binding,” it may be cited where it “does
not conflict with United States law or regulations.” United States Department of Justice Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Basic Law Manual: U.S. Law and INS Refugee Asylum Adjudications ch. II.B, reprinted in
8 Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure, Special Supplement 1995.
136

Matter of N-M-A, Int. Dec. 3368 (BIA 1998).

137

See id. at 11.

138

8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii) (2000).

139

Int. Dec. 3368, at 11 (BIA 1998).

140

Int. Dec. 3303 (BIA 1997).

141

Id.

142

Id at 4.

142

Id at 4.

143

Id. at 4-5.

144

Other BIA cases referring to the Handbook when dealing with issues of refugee law include: Matter of Y-B, Int.

Dec. 3337 (BIA 1998); Matter of H, Int. Dec. 3287 (BIA 1996); Matter of R, 20 I. & N. Dec. 621, 625 (BIA 1992);
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2. The Inconsistency Within U.S. Federal Courts
The BIA’s inconsistent use of the Handbook has resulted in the Handbook’s disfavor
within many U.S. federal courts.145 However, in Cardoza-Fonseca the Supreme Court embraced
the Handbook.146 The issue was whether a “clear probability” standard of proof governed
asylum applications.147 In the Cardoza-Fonseca Court’s determination that a “well-founded
fear” standard was more appropriate,148 the Court referred to paragraph 42 of the Handbook to
interpret the Protocol’s definition of “refugee.”149 The Cardoza-Fonseca Court explained that as
Congress sought to conform with the Protocol, the Handbook provided significant guidance in

Matter of Dass, 20 I. & N. Dec. 120, 125 (BIA 1989); Matter of Fefe, 20 I. & N. Dec. 116, 118 (BIA 1989); Matter
of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (BIA 1989).
145

For instance, in Stevic the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether a deportable alien must demonstrate a clear

probability of persecution in order to qualify for withholding of deportation. 467 U.S. at 409 (withholding of
deportation was considered under § 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1976 ed.), as amended by § 203(e) of the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 107). The Ninth Circuit
held that the burden of showing a clear probability of persecution no longer existed. See id. at 407. The court
reasoned that the Refugee Act changed the standard of proof to a well-founded fear of persecution. See id. The
Supreme Court, however, held that the likelihood of persecution is required for an alien to qualify for withholding of
deportation. See id. at 422. In doing so, the Stevic Court ignored paragraphs 37 through 65 of the UN Handbook
offering an interpretation of the “well-founded” fear provision in the Refugee Act. Fitzpatrick, supra note 136 at 14.
Cf. Scott Busby, The Politics of Protection: Limits and Possibilities in the Implementation of International Refugee
Norms in the United States, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 27, 32 (1997) (U.S. court decisions that cite the Handbook
follow its recommendations more often than not).
146

See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).

147

Id. at 425.

148

Id. at 427-50.

149

Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 438-3; see also Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1061-62 (3d Cir. 1997); Rodriguez-

Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1996); Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1511 (9th Cir. 1995); RamosVasquez v. INS, 57 F.3d 853, 863 (4th Cir. 1995); Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990), aff’d on
alternate grounds after remand, 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992); Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562 n.7 (9th Cir.
1984); Yang v. Carroll, 852 F. Supp. 460, 470 n.22 (E.D. Va. 1994).
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construing it.150 The Court did note, however, that the Handbook does not have the force of
law.151
B. International Acceptance of The Handbook
1. Europe’s Reliance on the “Fear of Persecution” Test
Some foreign domestic courts are unwilling to apply the Handbook in determining
asylum.152 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), on the other hand, has been more
receptive to a proportionality test in using future persecution as a factor for determining

150

See id. at 439 n. 22; see also Department of Justice statement that “[W]e assume that Congress was aware of the

criteria articulated in the Handbook when it passed the [Refugee] Act in 1980, and that it is appropriate to consider
the guidelines in the Handbook as an aid to construction of the Act.” U.S. Refugee Program: Oversight Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Congress, 1st Session 24, 26 (1981) (Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, office of
Legal Counsel, to David Crossland, General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service).
151

See id. The UN Handbook states that “the determination of refugee status under the 1951 Convention and the

1967 Protocol . . . is incumbent upon the Contracting State in whose territory the refugee finds himself.” Id.
Although the UN Handbook does not have the force of law, where it has not been followed by a U.S. court, the court
has generally explained its reasoning for not following the UN Handbook’s recommendations. See Busby, supra
note 147, at 32.
152

See, e.g.,T v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2 All E.R. 865 (H.L. 1996), where the House of Lords

was confronted with the issue of whether to grant political asylum to T (T was an Algerian citizen and had been
denied asylum by both the Special Adjudicator and the Court of Appeal). See id. T, the asylum-seeker in question,
had committed airport bombings and had raided a military depot, killing eleven people. See id. T asserted that his
removal would be contrary to Art. 33(1) of the Convention as his life or freedom would be threatened based on his
political opinions. See id. Lord Mustill rejected using a proportionality test that factored T’s threatened persecution
in determining asylum. See id. He explained that a crime either is or is not political. See id. Lord Mustill noted
that the character of the crime cannot depend on the consequences an offender may suffer if returned. See id. See
also the Canadian approach in Malouf v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (1995) 190 N.R. 230
(Fed. Ct. App.). There, the Court explained that Article 1(F) of the Convention, does not require a balance between
the seriousness of the applicant’s conduct against the alleged fear of persecution. See id. However, the Malouf
Court did reiterate its decision in Gil v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, (1994), 174 N.R. 292. The
holding there was that a “proportionality test” is appropriate for the purposes of determining whether a serious crime
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asylum.153 In Chahal v. United Kingdom,154 the British Home Secretary had detained Chahal for
deportation based on his threat to national security.155 Relying on Article 3, 5 (4) and 13 of the
Refugee Convention, Chahal argued that his deportation would expose him to a real threat of
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.156 The Chahal court agreed,157 and held that Article
33(2) of the Convention’s exception to the principle of non-refoulement based on danger to
national security requires balancing that danger against the degree of persecution feared.158
The use of a “well-founded” fear of persecution has been affirmed, in recent times, by the
fifteen members of the European Union (EU) who have issued a Joint Position on the
Harmonized Application of the Definition of the Term “Refugee.”159 The EU states that the

is political. See id. Therefore, the court’s decision presented an inconsistent use of the proportionality test and the
Handbook in Canadian courts. Id.
153

See Chahal v. United Kingdom, 13 E.H.R.R. 413 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1996); see also Beate Rudolf, European

Convention on Human Rights—Absolute Prohibition of Torture—Assessment of Real Risk of Being Subjected to
Torture Abroad—Effective National Remedy in Deportation Proceedings Involving National Security, 92 AM. J.
INT’L L. 70, 73 (1996) (assessing that the decision ensures refugee protection beyond that provided by the Geneva
Convention).
154

See id.

155

See id.

155

See id.

156

See id (the state of deportation would have been India).

156

See id (the state of deportation would have been India).

157

See id.

158

See id. This view was confirmed in Ahmed v. Austria, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413, where the European Court held that

as long as the applicant faced a real risk of being persecuted in his country, the applicant’s criminal record was
immaterial as to his eligibility for relief from expulsion under the European Convention.
158

See id. This view was confirmed in Ahmed v. Austria, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413, where the European Court held that

as long as the applicant faced a real risk of being persecuted in his country, the applicant’s criminal record was
immaterial as to his eligibility for relief from expulsion under the European Convention.
159

E.U. Doc. No. 96/196/JHA P. 13 (1996).
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persecution is to be outweighed against the nature of the criminal offense.160 Therefore, although
domestic courts have not been receptive to this proportionality test, the ECHR and the EU have
been quite receptive.161
2. International Commentators and the Proportionality Test
Most commentators have been receptive to using a “well-founded” fear of persecution as
a factor in determining a “serious nonpolitical crime” to withholding of deportation.162
Beginning with the historical debate on the Refugee Convention, many delegates expressed the
view that even in exceptional circumstances it would be intolerable to return a refugee to the
country of origin where “certain death” awaited.163 One delegate explained that when a person
with a criminal record seeks asylum as a refugee, the country of refuge needs to strike a balance
between the offenses committed and that refugee’s well-founded fear of persecution.164 In
addition, today’s commentators are in virtual unanimity for factoring a “well-founded” fear of
persecution in determining a “serious nonpolitical crime.”165 An individual may not be deported
for a “serious nonpolitical crime” where the risk and gravity of the persecution feared outweighs
the significance of the criminal conduct.166 Therefore, according to most commentators, a “wellfounded” fear of persecution should be a factor in determining a “serious nonpolitical crime.”
160

See id. The Joint Position however provides that it “shall not bind the legislative authorities or affect the judicial

authorities of the Member State[s].” Id. (Preamble).
161

See Rudolf supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.

162

See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 2.

163

Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, UN Doc. E/AC. 32/SR.20 at 15 (Feb. 1, 1950)

(remarks of the Chairman).
164

UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.29 at 23; see UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.24 at 13.

165

See, e.g., Goodwin-Gill, supra note 2, at 106-07; see also Grahl-Madsen, supra note 16, at 298; Hathaway, supra

note 14, at 224-25.
166

See id.

167

INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. 1439.
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IV. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre: The Supreme Court’s Misguided Determination
A. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Aguirre-Aguirre.167 First, the
Court held that because the Court of Appeals was confronted with questions implicating the
BIA’s construction of the statute that it administered, "the court should have applied the
principles of deference described in Chevron."168 Thus, the court should have asked: (1)
"whether the statute was silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue "before it; and (2)
"whether the agency's answer was based on a permissible construction of the statute."169 The
Aguirre-Aguirre Court added that in asking these questions, judicial deference to the BIA was
"especially appropriate in the immigration context."170
Secondly, the Court determined that the "Handbook may be a useful interpretative
aid."171 However, the Court noted that "it is not binding on the Attorney General, BIA, or U.S.
courts" in determining whether an alien is ineligible for withholding of deportation on the ground
that he has committed a "serious nonpolitical crime" before entering the United States.172 As a
result, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the BIA should have balanced
Aguirre-Aguirre’s acts against his risk of persecution.173 The Aguirre-Aguirre Court explained
that it was reasonable for the BIA to consider the risk of persecution by itself, and not as a factor

167

INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. 1439.

168

See id. at 1445.

169

See id.

170

See id.

170

See id.

171

See id. at 1447.

171

See id. at 1447.

172

See id. at 1446-48.

173

See id. at 1446.
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in determining whether the acts were serious and nonpolitical.174
Also, the Aguirre-Aguirre Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s assertion that the BIA
should have considered whether Aguirre-Aguirre’s acts were grossly disproportionate to their
alleged objective and atrocious in light of McMullen.175 The BIA’s method of determining a
“serious nonpolitical crime” identifies a general standard whether an offense’s political aspect
outweighs its common law character.176 The Aguirre-Aguirre Court then pointed out that two
specific inquiries may be used in applying this standard: (1) "whether there is a gross
disproportion between means and ends"; and (2) "whether atrocious acts are involved."177 The
Court further noted, however, that although an offense involving atrocious acts will result in a
denial of withholding of deportation, an offense’s criminal element "may outweigh its political
aspect even if none of the acts are deemed atrocious."178 Therefore, the BIA did not have to
consider "atrociousness . . . before determining [whether Aguirre-Aguirre had] committed a
serious nonpolitical crime.”179
Lastly, the Aguirre-Aguirre Court determined that the BIA did not have to give
"consideration to the 'necessity' and 'success' of [Aguirre-Aguirre’s] actions."180 The BIA was
required only to find Aguirre-Aguirre’s acts not politically based on the lack of proportion with

174

See id. at 1446-47.

175

See id. at 1447.

176

See id.; see also supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.

177

See id. at 1448.

178

See id.

179

See id.

179

See id.

180

See id.

180

See id.

181

See id. at 1449.
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his objectives.181 Therefore, "even in a case with a clear causal connection, a lack of proportion .
. . may still render a crime nonpolitical."182
B. The Potential Impact
The potential ramifications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Aguirre-Aguirre could
yield grossly inhumane results.183 This is primarily because the construction of the “serious
nonpolitical crime” exception for withholding of deportation would be made on a minimum

181

See id. at 1449.

182

See id.

183

Already, several decisions have been made using INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre. See Mwongera v. INS, 187 F.3d 323

(3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that “[T]o the extent that the BIA’s decision rests on an interpretation of the agency’s
governing statute on a matter as to which Congress has not expressed a clear intent, we defer to the agency’s
reasonable interpretation of the statutory language.”); Purveegiin v. United States INS Processing Center, 1999 WL
804128 (S.D.N.Y.) (“[I]t is well-settled that even if an applicant for asylum establishes that he is a “refugee” within
the meaning of the Act, the decision whether to grant asylum is still within the discretion of the Attorney General.”);
Phan v. Reno, 56 F.Supp.2d 1149 (W.D. Washington 1999) (“[M]oreover, judicial deference allows the political
branches to exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.”); Barapind
v. Reno, 1999 WL 627352 (E.D.Cal.) (“Judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the
immigration context where officials exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of
foreign relations.”); Matter of Li, 1999 WL 965437 (D.Hawai’i) (Judicial deference is especially appropriate in the
immigration context).
183

Already, several decisions have been made using INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre. See Mwongera v. INS, 187 F.3d 323

(3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that “[T]o the extent that the BIA’s decision rests on an interpretation of the agency’s
governing statute on a matter as to which Congress has not expressed a clear intent, we defer to the agency’s
reasonable interpretation of the statutory language.”); Purveegiin v. United States INS Processing Center, 1999 WL
804128 (S.D.N.Y.) (“[I]t is well-settled that even if an applicant for asylum establishes that he is a “refugee” within
the meaning of the Act, the decision whether to grant asylum is still within the discretion of the Attorney General.”);
Phan v. Reno, 56 F.Supp.2d 1149 (W.D. Washington 1999) (“[M]oreover, judicial deference allows the political
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v. Reno, 1999 WL 627352 (E.D.Cal.) (“Judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the
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foreign relations.”); Matter of Li, 1999 WL 965437 (D.Hawai’i) (Judicial deference is especially appropriate in the
immigration context).
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threshold of seriousness without regard to context.184 Such a construction would require the BIA
to deny refugee status in any case in which there were serious reasons to consider that a person
had committed a crime that reached this threshold.185 This denial would be without regard to the
likelihood and severity of the persecution feared.186 Secondly, the Aguirre-Aguirre decision will
continue to allow the BIA to neglect its previous decisions and to receive deference in cases
where it is litigating a position for the first time.187
In endangering future applicants for withholding of deportation, the Aguirre-Aguirre
Court erred in several respects.188 Primarily, the Court should not have given deference to the
BIA in eliminating persecution as a factor in determining whether an act is a “serious
nonpolitical crime.”189 The Court reasoned that the fear of subsequent persecution in Rodriguez184

See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. 1439 (1999).

185

See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Support of

Respondent; INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. 1439 at 17 (1999) (No.97-1754).
186

See id. Other considerations that might be disregarded are 1) the fact that many years have past since the act had

been committed; and 2) whether the suspect had served his sentence or been pardoned.
187

See Michael G. Heyman, Judicial Review of Discretionary Immigration Decisionmaking, 31 SAN DIEGO L.

REV.861, 871 (1994) (since Congress often provides agencies with inadequate standards for the performance of their
work, it may make a great deal of sense to defer to agencies on some issues, yet not on others); see also Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 470 (1985)
(Congress often provides agencies with inadequate standards for the performance of their work); Cass R. Sunstein,
Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2088-89 (1990) (although it is an important virtue
to give agencies the opportunity to administer their own laws in response to changing facts and needs, there still is a
need for courts to play an instrumental role in the interpretation of statutes, and that Chevron is but one guide in this
interpretive venture); Ortiz-Salas v. INS, 992 F.2d 105, 107-08 (7th Cir. 1993) (In reviewing the BIA’s decision of a
discretionary denial by an immigration judge, Judge Posner used the terms “astonishingly,” “irresponsible,” and
“incoherently” to characterize the quality of reasoning under review.). Posner was particularly perturbed by the
government’s statement that the BIA has no fixed standard of review, thus varying its standard from case to case.
Id. at 107.
188

See Aguirre-Aguirre v. INS, 121 F.3d 521 (explaining the factors that should be used in determining whether to

apply the “serious nonpolitical crime” exception).
189

See id.
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Palma and Ballester-Garcia were overturned by Rodriguez-Coto.190 However, a thorough
analysis of these cases establishes that at a minimum, these cases are inconsistent.191 First, in
Rodriguez-Coto, the BIA was not presented with a “serious nonpolitical crime” issue.192 The
issue was whether the alien’s behavior created a danger to the community.193 Therefore, any
disregard in factoring fear of persecution for withholding of deportation should be limited to only
cases confronted with that specific issue.194 Furthermore, the Rodriguez-Coto decision is further
doubted based on the activities of the INS.195 Only three years after the BIA decision in
Rodriguez-Coto, the INS published asylum regulations with regard to the “serious nonpolitical
crime” exception.196 In these regulations, the INS promulgated applying a standard that included
a full consideration of the totality of circumstances.197 If Rodriguez-Coto eliminated fear of
persecution as a factor in determining the “serious nonpolitical crime” exception, then the INS
190

See id.

190

See id.

191

See Matter of Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I & N Dec. 208.

191

See Matter of Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I & N Dec. 208.

192

17 I & N Dec. 208.

192

17 I & N Dec. 208.

193

See id.

194

The BIA’s decision to overturn Rodriguez-Palma and Ballester-Garcia is also doubtful as it was presented in a

footnote. Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I & N Dec. 208. If the Rodriguez-Coto Board was going to overturn these previous
cases it would have surely inserted such language in the actual opinion Id.
194
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regulations are completely contradictory.198
As a result of the doubtful precedent Rodriguez-Coto established and the inconsistency in
factoring fear of persecution in determining the “serious nonpolitical crime exception,” the
Aguirre-Aguirre Court was precluded from giving deference to the BIA.199 According to Bowen,
the deference explained in Chevron should not be given when an agency’s interpretation is
presented for the first time.200 Eliminating fear of persecution as a factor in determining the
“serious nonpolitical crime” exception constitutes an interpretation presented for the first time.201
First, the interpretation is unsupported by regulations.202 The statutory “serious nonpolitical
crime” exception does not provide the factors that should be relied upon in determining such an
exception.203 Second, the interpretation is not supported by rulings of the BIA.204 The closest
the BIA has come in eliminating the fear of persecution as a factor was in Rodriguez-Coto.205
That case, however, did not deal with a “serious nonpolitical crime’ issue.206 Third, the
interpretation is not supported by administrative practice.207 Evidence of this is the INS’s own
publication, which accepts a totality of circumstances standard in interpreting the “serious
nonpolitical crime” exception.208 Since Bowen explained that a litigation position that is
198

See id.

199

119 S. Ct. 1446.

199

119 S. Ct. 1446.

200

488 U.S. at 212-13.

201

See supra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
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203
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presented for the first time is one that is unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative
practice, eliminating fear of persecution should have also been considered as a first time
litigation position.209 As a result, the Aguirre-Aguirre Court should not have deferred to the
BIA.210
Instead, the Court should have determined the definition of a “serious nonpolitical
crime.”211 This should have been done following the reasoning of the Court in CardozaFonseca.212 In its statutory construction, the Aguirre-Aguirre Court should have first looked to
any express language.213 If the express language was ambiguous, then the Aguirre-Aguirre
Court should have looked to extraneous evidence, such as the legislative history of the statute.214
By deferring to the BIA, the Aguirre-Aguirre Court did not conform with its prior holdings in
Bowen and Cardoza-Fonseca.215
In addition, the Aguirre-Aguirre Court failed to use atrociousness as a factor in
determining a “serious nonpolitical crime.”216 Although the Court deferred to the BIA with
regard to fear of persecution, it did not do so with regard to atrociousness.217 The McMullen

209
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209
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210
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court recognized that the BIA found atrociousness to be a relevant factor in its determination of a
“serious nonpolitical crime.”218 However, the Aguirre-Aguirre Court held that the BIA was not
required to factor atrociousness in every “serious nonpolitical crime” case.219 The Court’s
reasoning was that a criminal element of an offense may outweigh its political aspect even if
none of the acts are atrocious.220 The flaw in this reasoning lies with the BIA when it established
atrociousness as a relevant factor in Matter of McMullen.221 Therefore, the Supreme Court
should have deferred, according to Chevron, to the BIA on the use of atrociousness.222 Further,
the BIA in McMullen realized that it had to qualify the word “serious” in “serious nonpolitical
crime.”223 According to the Aguirre-Aguirre Court’s reasoning, any nonpolitical crime may be
an exception to withholding of deportation regardless of its seriousness.224
Lastly, the Aguirre-Aguirre Court missed the opportunity to utilize the Handbook when
interpreting “serious nonpolitical crimes” in withholding of deportation cases.225 Although the

218

788 F.2d 596-97.

219

119 S. Ct. 1448.

220

See id.

221
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222

467 U.S. 837.

223
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224
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225
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Handbook does not have the force of law, it is, nonetheless, an important guide.226 As an initial
matter, the utilization of the Handbook’s interpretation would instruct and clarify the BIA’s
inconsistent interpretations.227 In addition, the utilization of the Handbook would allow the
“serious nonpolitical crime” to be evaluated equally with other matters for which the BIA defers
to the Handbook.228 Also, the utilization of the Handbook provisions would have further aided
its consistent use in other countries.229

V. Conclusion
The Aguirre-Aguirre Court failed to consider the Handbook’s “well-founded” fear of
persecution and atrociousness factors in determining whether Aguirre-Aguirre’s acts warranted
an exclusion of withholding of deportation. By not doing so, the Court did not adhere to the
spirit of the Cardoza-Fonseca decision. Furthermore, although the Court hinged its decision on
BIA deference, it ignored several BIA decisions. Moreover, where decisions were contradictory,
226

480 U.S. 439; see also Olson, supra note 154.

227

See infra pp. 17-18.

228

See supra note 148 (listing recent BIA decisions which have used the Handbook).

229

See supra text accompanying note 156; see also Chahal, supra note 158.
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the Aguirre-Aguirre Court simply chose which one it wanted to use. The fact that BIA decisions
should be given greater deference than other agency proceedings does not translate into complete
deference.

